Book I section 39.
‘καὶ φασὶ δὴ δίκῃ πρότερον ἐθελῆσαι
κρίνεσθαι, ἥν γε οὐ τὸν προύχοντα καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς προκαλούμενον λέγειν τι
δοκεῖν δεῖ, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἐς ἴσον τά τε ἔργα ὁμοίως καὶ τοὺς λόγους πρὶν
διαγωνίζεσθαι καθιστάντα.
[2] οὗτοι δὲ οὐ πρὶν πολιορκεῖν
τὸ χωρίον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὴ ἡγήσαντο ἡμᾶς οὐ περιόψεσθαι, τότε καὶ τὸ εὐπρεπὲς τῆς
δίκης παρέσχοντο. καὶ δεῦρο ἥκουσιν οὐ τἀκεῖ μόνον αὐτοὶ ἁμαρτόντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑμᾶς
νῦν ἀξιοῦντες οὐ ξυμμαχεῖν, ἀλλὰ ξυναδικεῖν καὶ διαφόρους ὄντας ἡμῖν δέχεσθαι
σφᾶς:
[3] οὓς χρῆν, ὅτε ἀσφαλέστατοι ἦσαν, τότε προσιέναι, καὶ μὴ ἐν ᾧ ἡμεῖς μὲν ἠδικήμεθα, οὗτοι δὲ κινδυνεύουσι, μηδ᾽ ἐν ᾧ ὑμεῖς τῆς τε δυνάμεως αὐτῶν τότε οὐ μεταλαβόντες τῆς ὠφελίας νῦν μεταδώσετε καὶ τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων ἀπογενόμενοι τῆς ἀφ᾽ ἡμῶν αἰτίας τὸ ἴσον ἕξετε, πάλαι δὲ κοινώσαντας τὴν δύναμιν κοινὰ καὶ τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα ἔχειν..
Subsection 1 is complicated.
‘καὶ φασὶ δὴ δίκῃ πρότερον ἐθελῆσαι
κρίνεσθαι,
The word tool wants ethelisai to be an impersonal gerundive in executive voice, indicative modality, meaning that while the Korinthians are not being definite about what the Kerkyraeans said, the Korinthians are subscribing to the truth of what the Kerkyraeans said. This is the opposite of what section 38 said: the Korinthians would not sign up to the truth of why the Kerkyraeans were sent out to Epidamnos. However, the number of this verb is wrong if it’s an epistemic. We would have to find an example of Thucydides using fasi plus a singular conjugated verb for a collective noun subject. While we have that in Biblical Hebrew, I haven’t noticed it in Classical Greek.
ἥν γε οὐ τὸν προύχοντα καὶ ἐκ τοῦ
ἀσφαλοῦς προκαλούμενον λέγειν τι δοκεῖν δεῖ,
“which…somebody ought to expect to say”, under specific circumstances. Those circumstances are not when “a pretext is proposed from a position of safety”,
ἀλλὰ τὸν ἐς ἴσον τά τε ἔργα ὁμοίως
καὶ τοὺς λόγους πρὶν διαγωνίζεσθαι καθιστάντα.
“…but for the sake of fairness offered words before picking up arms.”
In fact this is Freudian projection. The Korinthians did not notify the Kerkyraeans of what they were going to do but acted first. Now they have been soundly beaten and pretend that their multi-polis fleet was unfairly beaten.
Subsection 2 is similar, “these, not before starting a siege, but after we acted [so as] not to let it go on”, offered to arbitrate.
Subsection 3 has a nonsensical statement. Look at a map. Kerkyraea is now called Corfu, and it is well north and on the opposite side of the Peloponnese from Athins, whose colony of Ionia is to their east, within easy reach of their large navy. Epidamnus is north of Corfu in what is now Albania. Why would Kerkyraea bother Athins about Epidamnus? Why, with a history of having no alliances, would it share power with Athins? What would Korinth have done if such a thing had happened, sit on their thumbs? Not very likely.
And finally, the Korinthians having been soundly whipped, why do they claim that Kerkyraea is in danger? This is bad policy. The Kerkyraeans have just shown Athins that if Korinth gets control of Kerkyraea’s navy, they will have the power to destroy Athins. The Korinthians are actually underlining that they believe they can beat Athins anyway even if its navy is as big as that of Kerkyraea, and will do so after trumping up a reason.
Korinth has one
more mistake to make, relative to the actual treaty. What do they say?
No comments:
Post a Comment