The duplicate conditional is a commandment, not an
imperative. They are different. I’ll talk about imperatives last because they
lead into another segment of grammar.
If aspectless verbs are “on demand”, there are
commandments that are not “on demand”. The alternatives are a constant
requirement, or a scheduled requirement. Shabbat in the Big Ten isn’t really a
scheduled requirement, it’s on demand because the same rules apply to holy
days, which are moveable feasts. That’s why zakhor and shamor are
aspectless verbs.
I talked about vav plus imperfect verbs as
the envelopes to legal material, being the definition of when a court case can
exist. These are commandments in the sense that the court has to try the case
if the definition is met.
I talked about vav plus perfect verbs as
the specific issues to be tried, on which the court can convict or acquit. These
are commandments in the sense that the court has to try these, and only these
issues.
Instructions about rituals are also commandments. Some
of them are scheduled, like the tamid described in Exodus 29:38-42.
These commandments are all in the imperfect, meaning they are all definitions.
לח וְזֶ֕ה אֲשֶׁ֥ר תַּֽעֲשֶׂ֖ה עַל־הַמִּזְבֵּ֑חַ כְּבָשִׂ֧ים בְּנֵֽי־שָׁנָ֛ה
שְׁנַ֥יִם לַיּ֖וֹם תָּמִֽיד:
לט אֶת־הַכֶּ֥בֶשׂ הָֽאֶחָ֖ד תַּֽעֲשֶׂ֣ה בַבֹּ֑קֶר וְאֵת֙ הַכֶּ֣בֶשׂ
הַשֵּׁנִ֔י תַּֽעֲשֶׂ֖ה בֵּ֥ין הָֽעַרְבָּֽיִם:
מ וְעִשָּׂרֹ֨ן סֹ֜לֶת בָּל֨וּל בְּשֶׁ֤מֶן כָּתִית֙ רֶ֣בַע
הַהִ֔ין וְנֵ֕סֶךְ רְבִיעִ֥ת הַהִ֖ין יָ֑יִן לַכֶּ֖בֶשׂ הָֽאֶחָֽד:
מא וְאֵת֙ הַכֶּ֣בֶשׂ הַשֵּׁנִ֔י תַּֽעֲשֶׂ֖ה בֵּ֣ין הָֽעַרְבָּ֑יִם
כְּמִנְחַ֨ת הַבֹּ֤קֶר וּכְנִסְכָּהּ֙ תַּֽעֲשֶׂה־לָּ֔הּ לְרֵ֣יחַ נִיחֹ֔חַ אִשֶּׁ֖ה לַֽיהוָֹֽה:
מב עֹלַ֤ת תָּמִיד֙ לְדֹרֹ֣תֵיכֶ֔ם פֶּ֥תַח אֹֽהֶל־מוֹעֵ֖ד
לִפְנֵ֣י יְהוָֹ֑ה אֲשֶׁ֨ר אִוָּעֵ֤ד לָכֶם֙ שָׁ֔מָּה לְדַבֵּ֥ר אֵלֶ֖יךָ שָֽׁם:
How do you try a court case if you have no perfect
aspect specifics to rule on? Well, it means that a court has nothing to hang
its questions on if it wants evidence. Also notice that unlike Exodus 21:2,
there’s no ki plus imperfect aspect. The wording of that verse refers to
things that are known to happen, and then Torah goes on to regulate events. (Also
see my last post in Fact-Checking the Torah.)
This is different from, for example, Exodus 12:15,
ki kal-okhel chamets, in the commandments for Passover, which does envision
somebody eating leavened grain products during the prohibition. But it has
nothing to do with the ritual of the actual sacrifice offered at Passover.
There are ki clauses for getting into a
situation where you owe an olah, a chatat, or an asham,
but there are no ki clauses for the rituals of those sacrifices, or the shlamim
of any kind, until we get to Leviticus 7:22-27 with the prohibitions on eating chelev
or blood. They have nothing to do with performing the ritual, they have to do
with products of either ritual or shechitah for food.
If a sacrificial ritual is performed correctly,
the process is defined as hurtsah, acceptable. (This is a hufal legal
definition.) The punishment for a sacrifice that doesn’t fit the definition is keret,
extirpating all of a man’s descendants before he dies. Keret is only imposed by Gd. Some commandments
for which violations are punished by keret can be tried by an earthly
court, but they cannot convict without eligible witnesses and relevant
probative evidence. The violations of sacrificial ritual have to do with split-second
timing, physical transportation beyond a hairline limit, and human intentions,
all of which are knowable only to Gd. So it’s plain that you can’t let a court
try these cases. And there’s no sense having perfect-aspect clauses in
commandments about performing the rituals.
Judaism counts commandments including aspectless
forms and the 2nd and 3rd person verbs in both imperfect
and perfect aspects. And that’s how Judaism comes up with – not 10 – but 613
commandments.
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