Now I’m going back to contrast two
things I already talked about and bring up a new one. In Exodus 22:4 we had a
true if-then structure.
ד כִּ֤י יַבְעֶר־אִישׁ֙ שָׂדֶ֣ה אוֹ־כֶ֔רֶם וְשִׁלַּח֙
אֶת־בְּעִירֹ֔ה וּבִעֵ֖ר בִּשְׂדֵ֣ה אַחֵ֑ר מֵיטַ֥ב שָׂדֵ֛הוּ וּמֵיטַ֥ב כַּרְמ֖וֹ
יְשַׁלֵּֽם:
If a man sets fire to a field or vineyard, and his
burning gets out and burns in another field, the best of his field and the best
of his vineyard he shall pay.
The if-clause uses imperfect aspect
which has several functions. For one thing, it’s the definition of when there’s
a case. It cuts off other possibilities like lightning strikes or wildfires.
Jewish law also has the concept of proximate cause, which means that if
somebody’s stack burns up, for the owner to file a court case there has to be a
physically close fire started by a human within a reasonable time before the
stack catches fire. So while this verse says acher and not reehu
(another and not his neighbor), the trial should take into account proximate
cause.
The imperfect aspect also
acknowledges that this is something people sometimes do, which is not required
or prohibited by Jewish law. (Burning off weeds would be a reason for setting
the fire.) The ki commandments in Torah might therefore be prohibited by
a later court.
Now we edge over into the confusion
between this “if”, and the ki- of ki-tov in the creation story. In
Exodus 21:7 we have what looks like another if-then.
ז וְכִֽי־יִמְכֹּ֥ר אִ֛ישׁ
אֶת־בִּתּ֖וֹ לְאָמָ֑ה לֹ֥א תֵצֵ֖א כְּצֵ֥את הָֽעֲבָדִֽים:
But it’s not the same thing as shown
by later commandments using the hyphenated word. The real if-then is in verse 2:
ב כִּ֤י תִקְנֶה֙ עֶ֣בֶד
עִבְרִ֔י שֵׁ֥שׁ שָׁנִ֖ים יַֽעֲבֹ֑ד וּבַ֨שְּׁבִעִ֔ת יֵצֵ֥א לַֽחָפְשִׁ֖י חִנָּֽם:
Verse 2 establishes the concept of
the exclusive services contract along with its conditions like the term
limitation. Verse 7 goes into a case when this happens to an underage girl,
instead of a man. The point of the ki-yimkor is that the subject of this
contract has already been brought up, now we’re changing the conditions of the
situation to see how the law applies to a nonage girl.
In commandments that start with
the hyphenated version, some previous commandment establishes the situation as
something that can happen under Jewish law; it’s something that is neither
required nor prohibited.
Jewish courts aren’t allowed to meddle with
requirements or prohibitions in Torah, other than setting standards for whether
we care that the commandment might have been transgressed. Thus for utensils,
if they are broken to the point that they can’t serve their ordinary purpose,
we don’t care if they’ve been exposed to corpses or other sources of tumah.
Jewish courts are allowed to prohibit
things that were previously permitted, if they weren’t required. So they are
allowed to prohibit setting fire to your field no matter what your reason is.
And they are allowed to prohibit a man from taking
out an exclusive services contract on his underage daughter. Which they did in
the middle ages. Meanwhile, in the 21st century, more than one U.S.
state still allows child marriages.
So remember, with the hyphen it’s talking about an
existing situation, status, or condition, but without the hyphen, it’s the klal
of an allowed action that may have consequences which a court can punish.
