21st Century Classical Greek -- imperatives

Book I section 36. And the hammer blow to the argument.

‘καὶ ὅτῳ τάδε ξυμφέροντα μὲν δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι, φοβεῖται δὲ μὴ δι᾽ αὐτὰ πειθόμενος τὰς σπονδὰς λύσῃ, γνώτω τὸ μὲν δεδιὸς αὐτοῦ ἰσχὺν ἔχον τοὺς ἐναντίους μᾶλλον φοβῆσον, τὸ δὲ θαρσοῦν μὴ δεξαμένου ἀσθενὲς ὂν πρὸς ἰσχύοντας τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἀδεέστερον ἐσόμενον, καὶ ἅμα οὐ περὶ τῆς Κερκύρας νῦν τὸ πλέον ἢ καὶ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν βουλευόμενος, καὶ οὐ τὰ κράτιστα αὐταῖς προνοῶν, ὅταν ἐς τὸν μέλλοντα καὶ ὅσον οὐ παρόντα πόλεμον τὸ αὐτίκα περισκοπῶν ἐνδοιάζῃ χωρίον προσλαβεῖν ὃ μετὰ μεγίστων καιρῶν οἰκειοῦταί τε καὶ πολεμοῦται.

[2] τῆς τε γὰρ Ἰταλίας καὶ Σικελίας καλῶς παράπλου κεῖται, ὥστε μήτε ἐκεῖθεν ναυτικὸν ἐᾶσαι Πελοποννησίοις ἐπελθεῖν τό τε ἐνθένδε πρὸς τἀκεῖ παραπέμψαι, καὶ ἐς τἆλλα ξυμφορώτατόν ἐστιν.

[3] βραχυτάτῳ δ᾽ ἂν κεφαλαίῳ, τοῖς τε ξύμπασι καὶ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον, τῷδ᾽ ἂν μὴ προέσθαι ἡμᾶς μάθοιτε: τρία μὲν ὄντα λόγου ἄξια τοῖς Ἕλλησι ναυτικά, τὸ παρ᾽ ὑμῖν καὶ τὸ ἡμέτερον καὶ τὸ Κορινθίων: τούτων δὲ εἰ περιόψεσθε τὰ δύο ἐς ταὐτὸν ἐλθεῖν καὶ Κορίνθιοι ἡμᾶς προκαταλήψονται, Κερκυραίοις τε καὶ Πελοποννησίοις ἅμα ναυμαχήσετε, δεξάμενοι δὲ ἡμᾶς ἕξετε πρὸς αὐτοὺς πλείοσι ναυσὶ ταῖς ἡμετέραις ἀγωνίζεσθαι.’

[4] τοιαῦτα μὲν οἱ Κερκυραῖοι εἶπον: οἱ δὲ Κορίνθιοι μετ᾽ αὐτοὺς τοιάδε.

Gnoto is our first imperative and, as we might expect, it uses the all-purpose imperfective eventive.  This is for an event that is supposed to happen right now, if the audience accepts the speaker’s authority. This is different from how imperatives work in Biblical Hebrew. They are a test of whether the speaker has authority at all. If not, the imperative is never carried out.

I’m going over subsection 1 in detail because it’s pretty involved.

‘καὶ ὅτῳ τάδε ξυμφέροντα μὲν δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι,	to whoever says he thinks this is expediency,
φοβεῖται δὲ μὴ δι᾽ αὐτὰ πειθόμενος τὰς σπονδὰς λύσῃ,	yet fears lest by this means we convince him to [take steps] to possibly violate the treaty
γνώτω	know this
τὸ μὲν δεδιὸς αὐτοῦ ἰσχὺν ἔχον τοὺς ἐναντίους μᾶλλον φοβῆσον,	given – having strength – to the enemy fears [fears given to the enemy when you have strength]
τὸ δὲ θαρσοῦν μὴ δεξαμένου	[to the end of] making bold not to ally with us
ἀσθενὲς ὂν πρὸς ἰσχύοντας	is weak in relation to the strong
τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἀδεέστερον ἐσόμενον,	the enemy being caused no fear,
καὶ ἅμα οὐ περὶ τῆς Κερκύρας νῦν τὸ πλέον ἢ καὶ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν βουλευόμενος,	and at the same time not of the Kerkyraeans now more than of the Athinaians thinking
καὶ οὐ τὰ κράτιστα αὐταῖς προνοῶν,	nor of his own greatest concerns,
ὅταν ἐς τὸν μέλλοντα	whenever what is about to happen
καὶ ὅσον οὐ παρόντα πόλεμον	or the war that has not yet occurred
τὸ αὐτίκα περισκοπῶν ἐνδοιάζῃ	but is imminent, carefully considering does he hesitate
χωρίον προσλαβεῖν ὃ μετὰ μεγίστων καιρῶν	to take a land as partner that in the greatest measure
οἰκειοῦταί τε καὶ πολεμοῦται.	can be made either friend or enemy.

In other words strong people who hesitate to become stronger yet by an alliance with a strong partner, because they fear their enemy, do not frighten the enemy from starting a war.

Subsection 3 has the really important point. A, B, and C are equal in strength and none of them are allied to each other. If A lets C take B over, C has all of B’s resources to use against A. Whereas if A allies with B, they can easily defeat C. Up to now Korinth has had to spend money to hire Athinaians. If they can’t do that any more, which the Kerkyraeans urged in section 35, they need to take Kerkyraea over to stand off Athins. It’s in Athins’ best interests to make sure that doesn’t happen either, but if they let a little old treaty stand in their way – which Korinth will not – it’s over.