21st Century Bible Hebrew -- certainty epistemic

The difference between the evidentiary epistemic and the certainty epistemic is syntax. As I showed last week, the evidentiary epistemic comes at the start of a verse and is followed – somewhere – by a narrative past for the actions that are the evidence.

The certainty epistemic comes after material which would otherwise seem fantastic, except that there is perceptible evidence that it is true. This was all over the creation story, va-y’hi or and so on.

This is the grammatical analog of Olrik’s final localization, which uses the name of some place that is well-known to the audience, and may be visible during the narration. Usually the narrative has fantastic elements that the audience would not believe, except for the association with the known place. It gives the narrator credibility.

The other major set of certainty epistemics is in Exodus, at the end where they are making the tabernacle. Over and over again it says va-yaas X, where X is part of the tabernacle.

Considering the restrictions on use of the certainty epistemic, the Exodus cluster has implications for Jewish or at least Israelite history. There is no cultural support for using a certainty epistemic about the tabernacle unless the physical tabernacle coexists with the grammar of the narrative.

If the tabernacle did not exist when the wording of the narrative became fixed, BH would use a narrative past. There’s a perfect example in Numbers 32:31. The verb anah mostly shows up as an evidentiary epistemic, but this verse is an exception.

לא וַיַּֽעֲנ֧וּ בְנֵי־גָ֛ד וּבְנֵ֥י רְאוּבֵ֖ן לֵאמֹ֑ר אֵת֩ אֲשֶׁ֨ר דִּבֶּ֧ר יְהוָֹ֛ה אֶל־עֲבָדֶ֖יךָ כֵּ֥ן נַֽעֲשֶֽׂה:

The B’ney Gad and B’ney R’uven answered saying: what the Lord has spoken to your servants, thus we shall do.

The scenario is that two tribes of the Israelites have requested to take up their turf on the east of the Yarden. Mosheh is mad because it could discourage the others, so va-yaanu the tribal leaders that they will help on the west side of the river. This language shows that the audience had no cultural customs associated with this help. It happened and that’s all. If the narrator had tried to use an evidentiary epistemic here, the audience would have said “prove it.”

In both kinds of epistemic, the narrator does not need to provide supporting evidence beyond what is in the text. Whatever is in the clause with the narrative past, because it had historical or cultural results, is sufficient evidence to support the preceding evidentiary epistemic. And of course, the perceptible evidence is sufficient to warrant the certainty epistemic. Arguments that there never was a tabernacle, that it was a fairy tale made up as a backstory to the temple in Jerusalem, fall apart due to the grammar. There is also another reason.

Olrik’s principles state that people transmitting an oral tradition do not create cultural backstories. This means that the First Temple did not need justification, beyond what Kings states: Shlomo was carrying out what his father had projected. It was a royal project, similar to other royal projects throughout the region, like the pyramids and the Babylonian Gardens. It was an emblem of the victory over the Pelishtim, who had been reduced to the “Creti and Pleti” of David’s personal bodyguard.

But it was not a template from which Jews developed the parts of Torah about building the tabernacle. The tabernacle and its activities were the template for temple operations.

By the way, in case I didn't say this already, Dr. John Cook knew nothing about Olrik's principles. Olrik died about 1921; Dr. Cook's dissertation was approved in 2002. I read Olrik in 2003 or 2004 and the dissertation in 2014. Dr. Cook may have read Olrik by now, but his dissertation was based on prior linguistic papers. When two trains of thought parallel each other independently, it seems to me we're looking at a fact about how humans shape their communications through content and grammar to convince others that they are telling the truth.